New Mossad chief and escalating targeted operations inside Iran

What he says

An English translation of the talk, which is in Persian. It was made with AI from YouTube's automatic captions and may contain errors; the Persian transcript is authoritative. Click a timestamp to jump to that part of the video.

0:01 Hello. Friday, 14 Azar 1404, December 5, 2025. Today, the fourteenth of Azar, on the twenty-seventh anniversary of the killing of Mohammad Mokhtari and Mohammad Jafar Pouyandeh, two members of the Iranian Writers' Association, a ceremony was supposed to be held at their graves, and as in previous years the regime prevented it. This year, however, the security forces had effectively surrounded not only the burial site of these two writers but also the area outside the grounds, the whole complex, so to speak.

0:54 Their treatment was harsher than in previous years, and in any case they prevented the ceremony from taking place. They beat and arrested Sara Azad, who was released thanks to the resistance of members of the Writers' Association. In any case, this treatment, the beatings and so on, showed that the regime is still terrified of writers, of free thinkers, and of any reminder of the crime committed in the Chain Murders, which killed writers and intellectuals. That affair ultimately ended twenty-seven years ago with the killing of Saeed Emami,

1:51 deputy minister of intelligence, in prison. These events, one can say, reveal the regime's policies and how it is in fact terrified of writers, poets, free thinkers, intellectuals, thought, and of dissenters who do not think the way the regime does. It can also still be seen that the regime is terrified of an organization like the Iranian Writers' Association, which has a long history and a worldwide reputation through its affiliation with PEN International. Next, the debate between two clerics, Abdolrahim Mousavi Ardestani

2:49 and Hamed Kashani, which spread on social media, turned into a huge controversy. On one side was Mr. Mousavi Ardestani, a former lecturer at Mofid University in Qom and a member of the Assembly of Seminary Teachers and Researchers; on the other was Hamed Kashani, who belongs more to the hardline faction, the Paydari people and the Mesbah camp and the like. On the ninth of Azar, on the online channel Madreseh-ye Azad (Free School), which is broadcast on YouTube, they held a debate over historical views Mr. Mousavi Ardestani had previously expressed. But when the debate reached social media and spread, supporters and opponents went after him, and an uproar broke out

3:51 that is still going on. Some believe that the uproar over Mr. Mousavi Ardestani's remarks about Fatimah al-Zahra, the ninth Imam and so on, which contradict the fabricated narratives and stories of the eulogists and clerics, is mostly a news diversion, and that the regime has used the opportunity to effectively manufacture a fight that diverts people's attention from the main problems, such as air pollution, the water situation, inflation, land subsidence, and so on and so forth. But it must be said that these problems, as long as

4:48 they remain and the regime cannot solve them, no news diversion can distract people from them. People may pay attention to and follow certain news, but when their shopping basket and their dinner table shrink every day, or they breathe poisonous, toxic air, then as long as these problems are not solved, they remain, and basically no news diversion can turn people's attention elsewhere. Even if they pay attention to some news, these problems still remain at the center of their lives. But as for why what Mr. Mousavi Ardestani said caused such an uproar and led to cursing and insults, it reminds one of what Karl Marx

5:50 once said: that if you take away all seventeen principles of Christianity from these priests, they will not scream and shout as much as if we take away one-seventeenth of their lands. The issue is that the guild of eulogists and pulpit preachers, and the clergy in general, have for many years, perhaps centuries, earned their bread from the stories they have made up and told from the pulpits and in the tekyehs about the killing of Fatimah al-Zahra, or about Imam Hussein or the Imams and so on, and with the tears and sighs they extract from people, these days they make billions. That is why, if someone comes along with historical facts and

6:45 rational, reasoned arguments to make people realize that these claims are not true and that historical reality, historical documents and records, do not confirm them, then they go after him. Among them is this fabricated story that after the Prophet's death, a group who had a problem with Ali's succession went to his house and slammed the door against Fatimah al-Zahra's side, breaking her ribs, and that because of this she died some time later, forty days later, and even that they set the house on fire and so on. No reliable historical source confirms these stories. Besides, in those days the homes of the Arabs,

7:39 who also lived in absolute poverty, were usually four posts covered on the sides and top with palm fronds and the like, with no door, no window, no curtain, nothing; this is miles away from the image people have, as if they were like today's houses. But in any case, this story is the material for many rowzeh recitations and much weeping, and one can say it has in a way become a pillar of belief. The status constructed for the daughter of the Prophet, or the Prophet's stepdaughter, the last child of Khadijah, Fatimah al-Zahra, wife of Ali, the fourth caliph, is one of the issues over which the quarrels between Shia and Sunni

8:41 are fanned. In short, it serves not only as a kind of identity religion and a cause of division and so on, but, as I said, a group of people make a good living off it. Basically, if we look closely at the hierarchy and structure of the Shia clergy, we actually see three or four kinds of clerics. One group is the marja's, who have followers and collect religious dues; these days, of course, they have become very weak and have effectively become playthings of the regime. One group is the teachers of the seminaries, who go into teaching and stay in the seminaries. One group is the prayer leaders of mosques, who run mosques, and this group in fact collects the religious dues; it is mostly they, from the lucrative mosques, who determine the marja's as well. And the fourth group is the pulpit preachers,

9:39 and the eulogists in fact stand alongside these pulpit preachers. The pulpit preachers, who have the microphone and the pulpit at their disposal, are perhaps the loudest and most powerful part of the clergy. In fact, in the Islamic Republic too, if you look at the clerics, from Khamenei himself to others who have reached the highest government positions, it is mostly this pulpit-preacher segment that has also entered politics, and in any case their shop, their business, has thrived and continues to thrive on these very claims. And then, alongside the pulpit preachers, there are the eulogists, who organize gatherings, make people cry, and have set up various mourning processions and so on.

10:35 They are generally a foul-mouthed, thuggish bunch whom even the pulpit preachers fear. Now, these gentlemen, in the videos on social media, are ranting, hurling honor-related obscenities and so on, and threatening Mr. Ardestani with death, or anyone else who says such things. In effect, they are reacting so that their shop does not get shut down. Interestingly, even the Assembly of Seminary Teachers and Researchers, who seemed somewhat more enlightened, backed down and out of fear immediately said that Mr. Ardestani's words are his own and have nothing to do with us, and there are others who are trying to

11:33 distance themselves. In any case, the history of early Islam, which incidentally was written much later and is very much subject to criticism by historians, when it comes to the parts that have become the subject of quarrel and dispute, and the means of deceiving people and of rowzeh recitations and so on, has at times, one can say, taken a catastrophic form, steeped in lies, exaggerations, various heresies and false stories. Next, the appointment of Mr. Roman Gofman, Mr. Netanyahu's military adviser, as head of the Mossad, Israel's intelligence

12:27 agency, replacing Mr. David Barnea, the current head, whose five-year term ends next June, in Khordad, has caused a great stir, because he has no background inside the Mossad. His background, aside from the fact that he is from Belarus and came to Israel at the age of fourteen, is service in the army, in an armored brigade and so on, up to being Mr. Netanyahu's military adviser. Various interpretations have been offered inside and outside Israel, but regarding Iran it is said that Mr. Gofman is, first, someone with very hardline positions, a man of operations and so on, and second, a believer in continuing so-called pinpoint operations, that is, assassinations and hunting down

13:27 targets, apart from war, if it breaks out. Therefore, a continuation of pinpoint operations can be expected during his tenure. Next, the draw for the FIFA World Cup was held in Washington, and Iran's national football team was placed in Group G with Belgium, Egypt and New Zealand, which seems to be an easier group. But one point must be made: the regime, which has long had its filthy hands in football, with institutions, especially security and military ones, owning, controlling and exploiting popular teams, and various IRGC generals getting into club ownership

14:24 and football, has unfortunately spread this to the national team as well. We remember that in 1401 [2022], at the previous World Cup, at the height of the people's struggles, when the regime tried to exploit the popularity of football and the national team for its own benefit, how people turned their backs and even celebrated the national team's defeat. That is why the regime must be warned from now: if it does not take its filthy hands off the national team, which belongs to the general public, football being a beloved sport, this team may meet a fate similar to that of Iran's national football team in 1401. In hope of victory for Iran and Iranians.