Iran's Revolutionary Guards won't defend the regime to the last man
Opening
With the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps leading Iran’s military efforts in the Middle East war, Iran’s most powerful armed forces find themselves at the centre of attention—and the subject of many questions. Where did the IRGC come from? What is its current condition? Might it attempt a coup, or even turn its back on the very idea of an Islamic Republic? And, as the war stretches on, is it really the fearsome enemy it seems?
The IRGC was formed immediately after the victory of the Islamic Revolution in 1979; I was one of its founders, having previously been a leader of the student movement against the Shah. The Guards were originally intended to be a people’s army with no more than 5,000 professional personnel, and perhaps ten times as many semi-professional members, serving alongside the regular army in defending the country during times of war. Models such as America’s National Guard or the citizen-based defence forces in countries like Switzerland and Israel were considered as inspirations.
The opening of the article. The full text is published by The Economist (By Invitation).
Summary
In this By Invitation essay, Sazegara traces how the IRGC drifted from its founding idea of a small people's army in three stages: into the economy after the Iran-Iraq war, into politics to suppress the reform movement, and into terrorism and organised crime from the mid-2000s. He argues that it is not a coherent army able to stage a coup, that corruption at the top has eroded loyalty in the ranks, and that many members see their duty as protecting Iran rather than the supreme leader. He proposes redirecting that loyalty to a National Reconciliation Council of all main political currents, which would appoint a transitional government and hold an internationally supervised referendum on the Islamic Republic.
Summary written with AI. The full article belongs to The Economist (By Invitation).
